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CORPORATIONS-STOCK TRANSFER-ENFORCEABILITY OF REsTRICTIONS ON
RIGHT OF TRANSFER WHEN NoT STATED ON CERTIFICATE-A by-Iaw1 of defendant corporation provided tllat no stockholder could sell his shares
unless he first offered them for sale to the corporation or its directors.
The by-law also stated that this restriction should be printed on the stock
certificates and would thereupon bind all present or future owners or
holders. The corporation never complied with this latter provision. Plaintiff, having knowledge of the by-law restriction, purchased two shares of
the corporation's stock, but these shares were not first offered for sale to the
corporation or its directors. When the corporation refused to transfer
the shares, plaintiff sued to compel a transfer and the issuance of new
certificates to him. The equity court granted the requested relief. On
appeal, held, affirmed. Under the terms of the by-law and the requirements
of section 15 of the Uniform Stock Transfer Act,2 such a restriction is
not enforceable, even against one who has actual knowledge, unless
stated on the stock certificate. Jiopwood v. Topsham Telephone Co.,
(Vt. 1957) 132 A. (2d) 170.
Section 15 of the Uniform Stock Transfer Act has ·been adopted in
all but three states.s Under its provisions, a number of cases have arisen
in which an attempt was made to enforce restrictions on sale against persons who had actual knowledge of the restrictions, even though not
printed on the certificate.4 In two early cases,5 where the offending parties

Principal case at 171.
"There shall be no lien in favor of a corporation upon the shares represented by
a certificate issued by such corporation and there shall be no restriction upon the transfer
of shares so represented by virtue of any by-laws of such corporation, or othenvise, unless
the right of the corporation to such lien or the restriction is stated upon the certificate.''
Vt. Stat. (1947) §5880.
3 The section has not been adopted in North Dakota or Kansas. California has
adopted a substitute, omitting any reference to restrictions. Cal. Corp. Code Ann.
(Deering, 1953) §2479.
4 For a general review of cases prior to 1951, see 29 A.L.R. (2d) 901 (1951).
5 Baumohl v. Goldstein, 95 N.J. Eq. 597, 124 A. 118 (1924); Doss v. Yingling, 95 Ind.
App. 494, 172 N.'E. 801 (1930).
1
2
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were corporate officers, restrictions were held valid on the theory that
the officers owed a semi-fiduciary duty to the corporation and should
not be allowed to take advantage of the statute since they were in a position to see that the restriction was stated on the certificate. Some of the
more recent decisions, 6 however, though perhaps distinguishable from
the early cases, have taken a strict view of the statute and held that actual
knowledge of the restriction makes no difference if the statement is not
printed on the certificate. The principal case follows this trend, and, as
the statute is worded, proper principles of statutory construction suggest
no other result.7
Despite the fact that section 15 fulfills the commissioners' purpose
of making certificates of stock "so far as possible the sole representatives
of the shares which they represent," 8 it perhaps fails to take account of
certain practical considerations. Restrictions on sale of stock are found
most often in small closely held corporations where stockholders are more
than likely to be aware of the restrictions. Thus, the statute, as interpreted
by the majority of courts, often applies where it serves no purpose of
giving notice, but only contravenes the considerations which have supported restraints on alienation of stock, such as preserving the personal
element and resulting close control of the corporation. Reasonable restraints
seem therefore justified to help maintain this relationship.9 Where the
restraint stems from an agreement solely between the stockholders, the
likelihood is great that, as a practical matter, the statutory requirements
will be overlooked, and yet, the statute would still seem to apply to invalidate the restraint.10 While the problem is alleviated to a degree by
the "semi-fiduciary" exception when fOrporate officers are involved in
the transfer, at least one case has not seen fit to make this exception.11
It is admitted that a less strict requirement would introduce problems of
proof of actual knowledge, but the difficulties would seem to be justified
since the inequities which may result from application of the strict view
would be avoided.
In addition, the wisdom of applying the same strict rule to restric-

6 See, e.g., Costello v. Farrell, 234 Minn. 453, 48 N.W. (2d) 557 (1951); Security Life
and Accident Ins. Co. v. Carlovitz, 251 Ala. 508, 38 S. (2d) 274 (1949); Age Publishing
Co. v. Becker, 110 Colo. 319, 134 P. (2d) 205 (1943).
7 For an excellent interpretative analysis of §15, see Costello v. Farrell, note 6 supra,
noted in 36 MINN. L. REv. 269 (1952).
8 Commissioners' Note to §15, 6 UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED 20 (1922).
9 For analysis of validity of such restrictions and reasons for enforcing them, see
Cataldo, "Stock Transfer Restrictions and the Closed Corporation," 37 VA. L. REv. 229
(1951); 25 IND. L. J. 56 (1949); and IO UNIV. FLA. L. REv. 54 (1957).
10 This conclusion is based on the "or otherwise" phrase of the statute, note 2 supra.
However, in Tomoser v. Kamphausen, 307 N.Y. 797, 121 N.E. (2d) 622 (1954), the court
distinguished tlie case on this giound and enforced the restriction.
11 Sorrick v. Consolidated Telephone Co., 340 Mich. 463, 65 N.W. (2d) 713 (1954),
noted in 8 VAND. L. REv. 640 (1955).
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tions as is applied to liens12 is questionable for several reasons. First, the
practical necessity of calling the impediment to the holder's attention
is less in the case of a restriction. This results from the fact that a lien
usually affects only certain shares while restrictions generally apply to
all shares. In addition, a lien is just as likely to attach to a share of a
large corporation where the stock will probably be transferred without
personal knowledge of the affairs of the corporation, while, as seen above,
a. restriction is more likely to be found in a small corporation where
the probability of actual knowledge is much greater. Second, the combination of the two provisions in one section has made it unclear whether the
restriction must be printed on the certificate in its entirety. While the
phrase, "the right of the corporation," may refer only to the lien provision
of the section and the original intent may have been to have the restriction on transfer completely spelled out on the certificate, at least two
courts have held the contrary.13 Moreover, at least one legislature has
changed section 15 to require only a notice of the restriction, 14 and this is
recommended in the interest of simplicity.
In the light of the foregoing, it is suggested that consideration be
given to the following changes in section 15. First, provisions respecting
restrictions should be placed in a separate section. Second, stating the
restrictions on the certificate should be required to hold only persons
without actual knowledge of the restriction. Third, only a reference to
the restriction should be required, with some provision made for easy
access to a copy of the restriction. These changes in section 15 would
reconcile the practical need for restrictions on stock sales in small closely
held corporations with the policy of the statute to protect innocent purchasers, and, at the same time, make the statute clearer and facilitate compliance with its provisions.
L. Ronald Modlin

12 Note 2 supra.
13 Weissman v. Lincoln

Corp., (Fla. 1954) 76 S. (2d) 478 at 483, held the statute should
read, "the right of the corporation to . . . the restriction." In Allen v. Biltmore Tissue
Corp., 2 N.Y. (2d) 534 at 540, 141 N.E. (2d) 812 (1957), the court reached the same result
as in Weissman v. Lincoln Corp., while disapproving of its reasoning, by interpreting
the word "stated," to permit "incorporation by adequate reference." See note 2 supra.
14 'Minn. Stat. Ann. (1953; Supp. 1956) §302.16.

